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Private Rights and Collective Governance:
A Functional Approach to Natural Resources Law
Eric T. Freyfogle *
Natural Resources Law Center
Boulder, CO June 6-8, 2007

Natural resources law is the body of law that manages our collective interactions with the
natural world. For various reasons, we’ve found it useful to divide nature into pieces, to craft use
rights in the pieces, and then to integrate these use rights into governance regimes of one sort or
another. Some of the use rights are individually owned; others are held by groups, including
government bodies.
The common way of studying natural resources law is to examine resources one by
one–timber, grazing, mining, water, wildlife–while distinguishing pretty clearly between public
lands and private lands. State and federal laws are also kept mostly separate, and laws defining
use rights are viewed as somehow different from regulatory schemes that limit how people can
exercise their private rights. My aim is to offer a new way of approaching the field; a new way to
think about natural resources and to describe and respond to today’s challenges.
Natural resources law largely assumed its current shape between 1850 and 1950. Key
assumptions guided its formation: assumptions about nature, ecology, and ethics; about how
people might best use nature; about the key functions of private property; and about the relative
roles of various governments. This law reflected the dominance of American liberalism,
classically defined, as well as our growing belief that life was divided between public and private
spheres. Most of all it reflected a widely held that our nation was best served by the rapid, private
exploitation of nature, with government used chiefly to get resources into private hands, to
require fair play, and to resolve disputes.
For decades these assumptions have been under siege. Natural resources law, in
consequence, has faced strong pressures. For instance, we see now better than before the need to
integrate resource uses at landscape scales. Ecological interconnections are better known, and
we’re gradually recognizing the benefits of restoring and protecting basic ecological functions.
While we’ve known all along that individual resource uses don’t occur in isolation, only recently
have we seen starkly that resource-based goals quite often require coordinated action at large
scales. Furthermore, private actions frequently clash with the public good, even when they’re
economically efficient, while resource allocations that made sense a century ago now seem
distinctly out of date. And there are other pressures as well: new parts of nature are gaining
value; concerns about future generations are rising; and the cry has gone out for more
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“privatization” even while strident voices are reminding us that power over nature means power
over other people–power, too often, that’s unfair and oppressive.
In my new casebook, I set forth a different way of approaching the field, a rather
fundamental rearrangement of how we might understand and describe what natural resources is
about.
Whenever we divide nature into pieces, we need law to perform various particular
functions. Rather than study law on a resource-by-resource basis, we can approach it instead in
terms of these functions and the varied ways the law has performed them. Regardless of the part
of nature involved, the law needs to define the terms of a resource use right, or tell private parties
how they can do so. The law needs to allocate the resources in some way and prescribe
rules on their duration. It needs to explain how the rights of conflicting resource and landowners
will be resolved. It needs to provide mechanisms that foster resource reallocation over time,
given the inevitability that we’ll want changes in patterns of use. And it needs to prescribe
governance mechanisms to resolve disputes, to respond to change, and to keep ownership rules
up to date. These are the law’s basic functions, and it performs them in pretty much every
resource setting, in the United States and elsewhere.
When the law’s functions are explored, one by one, we can readily see how the same
challenges arise in various resource settings, in terms of defining rights, allocating them, setting
their duration, and the like. Cases involving different resources are put side by side, to see how
the experiences in one setting might inform our thinking about others. Consider, for instance, the
use of first-in-time as a resource-allocation method, employed in cases involving wild animals,
water flows, valuable mineral deposits, and recreation use rights. What a study of these cases
shows is that first-in-time allocation methods pose the same particular issues, regardless of
resource. First in time to do what? How do we date the act of being first, when the relevant
action extends over a period of time? What protection does a resource gatherer enjoy while
engaged in the search and capture? And what happens when too many people are first, or when
the reward for the labor of finding and capturing the resource appears excessive?
For a second example, consider the various ways that resources law resolves conflicts
between adjacent owners or between a resource owner and a landowner. Again, when we bring
materials together involving various resources we see that there are, in fact, only a limited
number of conflict-resolution rules that we might use, alone or in combination. And we can see
more clearly the difficulties of applying them. Similar insights come when we consider
comprehensively the various legal provisions that set the duration of resource use rights, and the
various means that the law uses in various settings to promote resource reallocation over time.
We also see linkages among the issues–for instance the close links between the issues of resource
duration and resource reallocation. Just as starkly, there’s the reality that public-interest limits on
resource allocation inevitably require limits on resource transfer, which means nonmarket
mechanisms need to be used, supplementing the market, to foster needed reallocation over time.
If they are not, resources get stuck in increasingly inappropriate uses.
My proposed approach to natural resources law spends considerable time on a
preliminary issue–what parts of nature are attached to land so that a landowner acquires them
automatically and what parts instead are available for separate acquisition. To confront this issue
directly is to see that the law’s answers have little to do with logic and more to do with culture
and politics. It is also to see the recurring problems that arise when the law does sever a part of
nature from the larger ecological web. Nature doesn’t divide easily, and line-drawing causes

headaches. Here, again, a comparative study offers insights. What becomes apparent, too, is that
“land” as we understand is perhaps best understood simply as a bundle of resource rights that
have been allocated together, rather than one by one. Indeed, we may be approaching the day
when land law and natural resources law are viewed as a single field, with natural resources law
the larger, more encompassing category.
Most of what I’ve talked about so far has to do with distinct resource use rights, whether
on public or private land, and the challenges of defining those use rights. Along with this large
issue is the related one of governance methods. In my book, I directly challenge the presumed
divide between public and private land, noting their many similarities and proposing that we
study them together. Similarly, I challenge the presumed divided between the private and public
entities that exert control over the ways nature is used. Indeed, I argue, perhaps the most vital and
engaging field of work for natural resource scholars, looking ahead, is to craft new ways for
people to get together to oversee and govern their various resource-use activities–new
governance mechanisms that blend or transcend the public and private as we know them. One
lesson that’s learned, once we give thought to governance mechanisms, is that we’re overly prone
to distinguish between the laws that prescribe private rights and the mechanisms that we use to
enforce them. Many resource rights are defined in vague terms, and they gain clarity only through
the governance processes that we tend to view as mere enforcement. Put otherwise, the
governance mechanisms that enforce private rights often are involved in clarifying the substance
of those rights; they make the law, that is, even as they enforce it. To see this is to realize that
we can often do a better job improving resources law by improving governance mechanisms and
giving them overt roles in defining private rights and redefining those rights over time.
In many ways this functional approach offers fresh benefits and insights. Most evidently,
it facilitates comparative study, allowing us readily to use experiences in one resource setting to
improve the law in another. It also puts contentious issues in new, more useful light. Private
condemnation, for instance, has a long history in natural resources law–though most property
lawyers seem not to know it. Why for generations we allowed private condemnation, and why it
might be good to continue allowing it, becomes more clear when we see it as one of many
alternative methods of resource reallocation; one of several methods of responding to the
market’s many limits. Is private condemnation fair or necessary? How can we know unless we
identify and make comparisons with its functional alternatives. And to offer a final brief lesson,
there’s the much-lauded right of landowners to exclude, viewed by some today as perhaps the
key landowner right. What a functional study reveals is that, in fact, natural resources law offers
many examples in which the landowners’ right to exclude is curtailed so as to facilitate the
beneficial use of discrete resources.
One of the aims of my book, in terms of student learning, is to enable students to craft a
natural resource regime for some part of nature that we have not heretofore viewed as valuable.
Once the law’s functions are all known, and once the familiar approaches in each functional area
are set forth with their pros and cons explored, it then becomes rather easy to take on this task, or
at least to set forth what the law needs to do and how it might go about doing it. A related virtue
of this approach is that it greatly helps students understand the natural resources law regimes of
other countries. Lawmakers elsewhere can and do prescribe rules governing natural resources
that differ substantially from those in the United States. But their laws necessarily perform the
same functions, and they necessarily choose from the same suite of legal options. The student
who knows the law’s key functions can readily ask questions in another country and synthesize

the answers. Similarly, foreign students studying American natural resources law acquire a
framework of understanding that is more readily transported into other legal systems.
As our landscapes become more crowded, and as we push ever harder against our
continents physical capacities, we need to find sound ways to tailor our resource-uses to the
land’s physical features. We need to find better ways to accommodate multiple resource-uses in
the same place at the same time. We need to think clearly and flexibly about the ways we define
and redefine resource use rights, drawing upon the enormous wisdom embedded in our legal
history. And we need to craft new, better mechanisms of collective governance at various spatial
scales, drawing upon the experiences of resource users themselves and helping people see how
good governance can improve their lives.
My prediction is that natural resources law is at the beginning of an extraordinary new
phase of development. We’ve done our best to tinker with and repair the natural resources system
that arose in liberal, frontier America when exploitation was the unquestioned goal. The system,
though, is merely clunking along today, causing frustration. We need a new design. Our land-use
goal now is quite different from what it was a century and more ago. It is to find ways of living
collectively on land that can endure; ways that keep our lands ecologically healthy and pleasant
as places for us and our descendants to dwell. It is a vastly different goal. We’ll need new legal
tools to achieve it.

